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RECENT DECISIONS
faith purchaser for value to take free of the defect.31 The broad defini-
tion given to "purchasers" would probably include any type of credit-
ors.32 Therefore, under the Uniform Commercial Code, the principal
case would probably have been decided the same way.
IRviN J. FRIEDLAND
Sales: Liability of a manufacturer of ingredient to another food
processor based on breach of warranty of fitness for human con-
sumption-Plaintiff biscuit company used snow ice to reduce the
temperature of the dough in its preparation of frozen biscuits to be
sold to the public. Shipments of ice were delivered each day by a
distributor, Crossland Ice Service, from defendant ice company. The
defendant placed the shipping tags on the bags of ice and knew the
destination and that the ice would be used by the biscuit company for
preparing food for human consumption. Glass was discovered in sev-
eral of the bags of ice after some frozen biscuits had already been
prepared with part of the ice shipment. Plaintiff destroyed all dough
that had been prepared with that shipment of ice and, being uncertain
as to which day's shipment of ice contained the glass, recalled and
destroyed those biscuits already distributed that may have been con-
taminated by the glass.
At the trial in district court' the jury made several findings: that
the ice contained glass when sold and delivered; that the defendant
knew it was to be used in the preparation of food for human con-
sumption; and that the plaintiff had been injured as a result of the
contamination of the ice with glass. The jury determined damages
using as a basis the cost of biscuit materials destroyed, and the cost
of distribution and recall of the biscuits. Nevertheless, the court denied
recovery n.o.v. holding that the remedy for breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness for human consumption was available only to a con-
sumer.
Held, reversed on appeal.2 It was determined that a food processor
who discovers that his product has been adulterated by a deleterious
substance in one of the ingredients supplied by another manufacturer
may recover from that manufacturer (although there is no privity or
allegation of negligence) on the ground that there has been a breach
of warranty of fitness for human consumption.
The court found that the ice, if not a food in the nutritive sense,
32 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §1-201 (33), and §1-201 (34).31 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §6-110 (2).
' Gladiola Biscuit Company v. Southern Ice Company, 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D.
Tex. 1958).
2 Gladiola Biscuit Company v. Southern Ice Company, 267 F. 2d 138 (5th Cir.
1959).
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must be regarded as a commodity for human consumption. The Texas
court has held that in the case of food products, a consumer can
recover directly from the manufacturer for injury from contaminated
food on the ground of breach of implied warranty of fitness for hu-
man consumption imposed by operation of law as a matter of public
policy.3 In the present case the court looked to the nature of the "pub-
lic policy" upon which this implied warranty is based and determined
it to be the protection of consumers from the injurious consequences
of deleterious foods and beverages. The court decided that this pro-
tection could only be adequately achieved by preventing unfit products
from entering the market.4
Up to this time the implied warranty of public policy for the pro-
tection of the consumer was used as a consumer's remedy to compen-
sate for personal injury occasioned by eating or using the contaminated
product.5 Since this warranty is created by operation of law it need
not depend on any privity between the parties. 6 In the present case,
however, this warranty was used in favor of a food processor, not a
consumer, and recovery was allowed for property damage rather than
personal injury.
Here the court seems to have expanded the scope of the public
policy warranty. Adequate protection of the consumer requires that an
implied warranty of law be imposed on all who manufacture or process
food products or any ingredients thereof. This warranty is available
to anyone who may be injured by reason of the contamination of the
product, whether by personal injury from the use of the product or
property damage because of inability to use or resell the product.
In similar cases where a manufacturer or processor has attempted
to recover property damage for breach of warranty the courts have
generally denied recovery in the absence of privity. For example,/
recovery was denied in a case where a manufacturer sold cholocate
with peanuts as "peanut waste" to a company which in turn sold the
3 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps et al, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 142
A.L.R. 1479 (1942). The manufacturer of sausage sold by it to a retailer
for resale for human consumption was held liable to a consumer for injuries
sustained as a result of eating the sausage which was contaminated, under
an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption imposed by operation
of law as a matter of public policy.
4 "Texans cannot be assured of food fit for Texans unless those who package it,
and those who furnish its essential ingredients supply the items fit for con-
sumption. Gladiola Biscuit Company v. Southern Ice Company, supra note 2
at page 141.
5 Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., - Okla. _ 330 P. 2d 375 (1958);
Biedenham Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939).
6 "Such a warranty is an obligation which the law imposes without regard to the
supposed agreement of the parties. It is neither promissory nor contractual
in its nature." Fossum v. Timber Structures, Inc., Wash. , 341
P. 2d 157, 161 (1959); B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F. 2d 501 (10th
Cir. 1959).
7 Philip Silvershein Corp. v. S. A. Wald & Co., 12 N.Y.S. 2d 256 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1939).
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merchandise as "chocolate with peanuts" to plaintiff to be manufactured
into chocolate bars for sale to the consuming public. Although the
chocolate was found rancid and unfit for human consumption, the
plaintiff was unable to recover for breach of warranty from the original
manufacturer because there was no contractual relation between them.
On the basis of the present decision a Texas court would probably
have found the original manufacturer liable for having breached the
implied warranty imposed by law for the protection of the consumer.
A possible distinction from the facts in the present case which might
be drawn is that the candy manufacturer would very likely not expect
chocolate "peanut waste" to be resold for manufacture of chocolate
bars by the sub-purchaser. The court in the present case did not lay
any stress on the knowledge of the manufacturer of the intended use
of the product, but the jury had made a specific finding that the ice
company had actual knowledge that the ice would be used in the
preparation of food. It is suggested that the Texas court would prob-
ably limit the applicability of the rule in the present case to those cases
in which the defendant manufacturer knows or should know that the
product will be used for human consumption.
Perhaps, logically, the rule of the present case could be extended
to products which are dangerous instrumentalities. In a New York
decisions an airlines company was unable to recover the cost of re-
pairing latent defects in airplane engines allegedly caused by the neg-
ligence of the defendant manufacturer of those engines because of lack
of privity. The engines were first sold to the aircraft manufacturer
vho sold the airplanes to the plaintiff. The fact that the faulty engines
rendered the airplanes on which they were installed imminently dan-
gerous to life would seem to bring the case under the rule in the present
case. The engine manufacturer would surely know that the aircraft en-
gines were to be used on aircraft, and if defectively made would make
the aircraft dangerous. A Texas court might very well decide that the
public policy for the protection of the consumer-passenger would re-
quire an implied warranty to be imposed on all who supply component
parts of an aircraft so that anyone who might be physically injured
by reason of defective manufacture may recover for breach of that
warranty. However, in the Trans-World Airline case the claim was
for the cost of repairing the engines to make them safe for flight. The
Texas court has restricted the rule in the Decker decision to cases
involving products for human consumption." Since the court in the
present case took the time to determine that ice is a commodity for
human consumption, it may have intended that this warranty by re-
stricted to such products. It seems clear that this liability without fault
8 Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.
2d 284 (1955).
9 Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W. 2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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based on public policy warranty sans privity should be limited at least
to products which if defectively manufactured would be dangerous to
the life or health of the consumer.'
One question raised by this case is the type and extent of property
damages recoverable by one who purchases for resale for breach of
this implied warranty. Here plaintiff's recovery was limited to neces-
sary expenditures; but these were the only damages claimed. Loss of
expectant resale profit was not included. In those cases where privity
of contract is established, loss of profits is recoverable for breach of
warranty damages." A retail grocer has been allowed to show as an
element of damages, that business dropped after a customer in his store
discovered a dead mouse in a bottle of milk supplied by the defendant
dairy company.'2 It is suggested that loss of profits or loss of business
should not be recoverable under the present theory. Since this implied
warranty is imposed by law for the protection of the consumer, it
would seem that damages should be limited to those necessary to pro-
tect the consumer. In most situations these would be only the neces-
sary expenditures; the cost of taking the product off the market and
the cost of the goods which are destroyed, or where possible, the cost
of remedying the defect in the product so as to make it safe for the
consumer.
It seems that this implied warranty can only be imposed for the
benefit of the purchaser for resale on products upon which it would
be imposed for the benefit of the consumer.' 3 It should only be imposed
in those situations where the defendant manufacturer knows or has
reason to know the intended use of his product. It is suggested that
damages be limited to only those expenditures necessary to protect
the consumer from the harmful product.
WILLIAM HAYDEN
10 Thus in a somewhat similar fact situation a contractor could not recover
against the remote manufacturer for defective building laths by using the
theory in this case. The faulty laths would not be said to make the building
a dangerous instrumentality. A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders
Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 662 (1938).
"1 Canton Provision Company v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935);
Swain v. Schieffelin, 134 N.Y. 471, 31 N.E. 1025, 18 L.R.A. 385 (1892).
12 Southwest Ice and Dairy Products v. Faulkenburg, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.
2d 257, 17 A.L.R. 2d 1373 (1950).
13 At the present time most jurisdictions which apply this warranty based on
public policy restrict it to certain products: food, beverages, and drug items.
Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F. 2d 314 (8th Cir. 1959) ; La Hue v.
Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P. 2d 421 (1957).
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